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Geography or Politics? Regional Inequality in Colonial India1 
TIRTHANKAR ROY 
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, t.roy@lse.ac.uk 
 
Explaining regional inequality in the nineteenth century world forms a major 
preoccupation of global history. A large country like India, being composed of 
regions that differed in geographical and political characteristics, raises a parallel set 
of issues to those debated in global economic history. With a new dataset, the paper 
attempts to tackle these issues, and finds evidence to suggest that regional 
differences, and divergence, were significantly influenced by geographical conditions. 
 
 
The divergence debate of the last decade has stimulated research on the 
economic history of the non-European world. While trying to answer the broader 
question, why Asia, Africa, or Latin America fell behind Europe in the nineteenth 
century, the scholarship also emphasizes the heterogeneity of growth experiences 
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within the periphery. The heterogeneity is seen to derive from two sources, 
colonialism and geography. European colonial rule, which was an agent in 
institutional change, is believed to have produced diverse legacies on property rights 
and public goods in the nations that attained freedom in the middle of the twentieth 
century (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, 2001; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
2008; Austin, 2008). Locally rooted factors such as natural resource endowments 
are seen to have played a role too, either directly by shaping the ability of individual 
regions to gain from trade, or indirectly by shaping competition for resources and 
institutional outcomes of such competition (Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; Sachs, 
2003). 
Deep heterogeneity in both these senses was present within a large peripheral 
entity, India; so much so that the question why India stayed poor while Europe 
became rich cannot have a single answer at all. The answer must depend on which 
part of India one considers. How different were the Indian regions, why were they 
different, and was the gap between them growing or narrowing in the era of colonial 
rule? One reason to enter the subject is that the answers to these questions should 
share parallels with the divergence discourse. Another reason arises from the 
historiography of India. Historians have long acknowledged the need to study 
regional differentiation to be able to qualify any general statement about economic 
transformation in India. A review of the field observes that, ‘social and agricultural 
regions both smaller and larger than provinces have increasingly seemed appropriate 
units to scholars’ (Bayly, 1985, p. 584). Another overview notes that ‘South Asia 
possessed a .. series of regional economies’ (Washbrook, 2001, p. 373). However, a 
shared strategy about how regional differentiation should be incorporated into 
economic history did not exist until recently. 
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A recent scholarship has broken new ground by conducting quantitative 
studies of regional inequality. It has found empirical support for the proposition that 
present-day regional inequality owes to two particular colonial legacies, property 
right and indirect rule. The paper is a re-examination of the issues raised in this 
scholarship with the aid of new dataset, and reaches a different conclusion. In 
particular, the role of natural resource conditions receives greater emphasis in the 
present paper. The rest of the paper has six sections: the nature of regional 
differentiation and interpretations thereof in the current literature, empirical 
strategy, three sections on data analyses, and conclusion. 
 
Historiography 
The productive power and livelihood pattern of Indian regions differed greatly 
around 1900. A district such as Bombay was possibly the most industrialized in the 
contemporary tropical world. In the central Indian uplands, Chanda district had little 
industry and only 15 per cent of its land under cultivation. The capital of this district, 
which was as large in area as Belgium, was a town of 17,000 people. Both Bombay 
and Chanda belonged in British India, but in very different geographical zones, 
coastal-deltaic in one case and forested uplands in another. In addition to these two 
zones, India contained high mountains, floodplains, savannahs, rainforests, boreal 
forests, and a tropical desert (see Map 1 for broad geographical divisions). In the 
past, such diversity made transportation cost highly variable across space. Even as 
one of the world’s largest railway networks came up in India, and terminated at a 
leading Asian seaport in Bombay, Chanda in the interior remained virtually without 
wheeled traffic until late in the nineteenth century. 
There was another way in which differences emerged and impinged on 
economic prospects, namely, political and institutional. India did not represent a 
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well-defined political entity in 1800 whether in European documents or in 
indigenous ones. British colonialism contributed to political integration, but it 
created its own divisions. A little over half of the territory in colonial India (1857-
1947) was directly governed by the Crown, the remainder being governed by the 
Indian princes and autonomous tribal councils. Although their affairs were observed 
by and sometimes supervised by British-appointed residents or commissioners, 
formally the freedom to rule was respected (Map 2).1 The relationship between 
British India and the princely states is often captured by the phrase indirect rule. 
These princely states were the kingdoms, many of them former vassals of 
Maratha or Mughal empires, that British India did not annexe to itself. The political 
ground for not doing so was that these states were allies of the British, and those in 
northern India had demonstrated the loyalty during the great mutiny (1857). But, 
then, nearly all of these states were land-locked, arid or poorly irrigated, with forest 
cover, and for these reasons, did not yield as much value as it might cost to acquire 
and maintain them. The states left alone were, nevertheless, required to maintain 
open borders to commercial traffic. They could have their own currency or legal 
systems, but the monetary autonomy existed only in name. Most had little incentive 
to insulate themselves from the pan-regional economic tendencies. No state was 
known to want to erect obstacles to market integration with British India. Most of 
them were also pro-Empire in sentiment and resisted independence in 1947. 
Depending partly on when and in what manner colonial rule had come into 
existence, the directly ruled territory became differentiated in respect of rural 
property rights. Possibly the most important institutional innovation undertaken by 
the East India Company state in 1793-1820 was the definition of the legal title of 
ownership of land and the creation of a system of courts and legal procedures to 
verify and uphold the right.  This was in theory and in practice a departure from the 
5 
 
past system where land ownership, with or without secure title, was tied to the 
performance of fiscal duties, so that a peasant and a tax collector could both lay 
claims on a plot of land. The situation had stymied the land market, in the view of the 
colonial administrators. Their solution was to create an unencumbered ownership 
title. In practice, the title was delivered to former tax collectors (landlords or 
zamindars) in one part of India, individual peasants in southern and western India, 
and peasant collectives or extended kinship groups in parts of northern India. 
Did regional differences in economic conditions derive mainly from 
geographical diversity or from political-institutional diversity? Were they mainly 
‘natural’ or mainly ‘manmade’? Until recently, the empirical literature did not 
present a clear answer to questions like these, which have a bearing on discussions of 
the long-term growth pattern in India. In the 1960s and the 1970s, a neoclassical 
strand in the literature explored the growth-inequality interaction, testing the then 
popular hypothesis that market-led growth should benefit regions that had resources 
in demand in abundance, whereas a ‘backwash’ effect might lead to a spatial 
concentration of the gains from trade (Williamson, 1965; Myrdal, 1957). Another 
contemporary strand, inspired by the concepts of ‘enclave’ and ‘parasitical cities’, 
paid attention to unequal political power of business groups (Hoselitz, 1954-5; Leys, 
1974; Bagchi, 1976). But neither approach engaged with history or geography very 
deeply. 
A recent scholarship has returned the field to the geography-versus-politics 
problem. It tests the association between the political-institutional legacies of 
colonialism and late-twentieth-century pattern of regional inequality in the supply of 
public goods, and finds it to be statistically significant. One key contribution, 
Banerjee and Iyer (2005), make use of the World Bank agriculture and climate 
dataset for India, which provides annual averages for 400-odd districts during 1957 
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to 1986. Their main result, which uses a subset of districts, is that in those districts of 
British India where the colonial rulers had delivered property rights to non-
cultivating landlords or zamindars (in 1793), rather than to the cultivating peasant, 
agricultural productivity was higher and investments lower in the post-independence 
period. The underlying argument is that in the landlord areas, conflicts and lack of 
cooperation between the elite and the peasants became more likely and made 
lobbying for resources in the post-independence period less successful. Banerjee, 
Iyer and Somanathan (2010) use the World Bank dataset for an expanded number of 
districts, divide these up into those that were formerly princely states (indirectly 
ruled) and those forming part of British India (directly ruled) as well as by landlord 
property and peasant property areas. They find that the provision of some of the 
public goods examined was negatively correlated with a dummy for districts which 
had formerly been directly ruled and under landlord systems. 
A third contribution to this scholarship, Iyer (2010), supplements the direct-
indirect-rule data by public goods data for 1961-1991, and estimates the relationship 
between being directly ruled in the colonial period and agricultural performance and 
provision of public goods in the modern period. In this analysis, the motivation of 
princely states to perform is explained with reference to the landed property regimes 
and an annexation threat first applied systematically during ‘the doctrine of lapse’ in 
force between 1846 and 1856. Iyer (2010) finds no significant effect of direct rule on 
agriculture, but a negative effect on public goods. The reason adduced for this is that 
the princely states were less constrained by British Indian priorities, as well as faced 
an incentive to be well-governed, being under threat of removal by the British.2 
The confirmation found in this corpus that the princely states were more 
progressive than British India and indirect rule more welfare-inducing than direct 
rule overturns an earlier result from a more limited statistical test (Hurd, 1975a; 
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Simmons and Satyanarayana, 1979). The result contradicts the perception of states 
that their development potentials lagged behind those of British India, as well as 
conclusions of comparative studies (Hurd, 1975b; Haynes, 1980).3 The new 
scholarship has spawned several attempts at extensions (Kapur and Kim, 2006; 
Chaudhary, 2010) and one critique of the methodology of Banerjee and Iyer (2005) 
(Iversen, Palmer-Jones, Sen, 2013; see also Banerjee and Iyer, 2013). 
Although the empirical strategy adopted in these contributions is innovative, 
it has limitations. There are three issues in particular. First, the colonialism and 
public goods scholarship takes for granted that the formal designation of a region (as 
landlord or as a princely state) should in theory correspond to a substantive 
institutional type. This issue of the coincidence or otherwise of formal and 
substantive institution is under-researched, and where researched, disputed. A few 
examples will illustrate the problem. In the core zone of landlordism, Bengal, 
historians disagree on who actually controlled land and, in turn, shaped local politics 
(Ray, 1979). The debate on the Central Provinces (Iversen, Palmer-Jones and Sen, 
2013; Banerjee and Iyer, 2013) demonstrates the need to do archival research on the 
coincidence between the formal designation of a district as ‘zamindari’ and the real 
economic and political power enjoyed by the zamindars. On the other hand, in some 
of the princely states, the ‘elite’ who descended from warlords and nobility much like 
the landlords in British India controlled land and influenced the dispensation of 
public goods. One example of elite power was Hyderabad, the largest among the 
princely states (Leonard, 1971). The public goods literature also assumes that the 
relationship between British India and the princely states was significant, uniform, 
and well-defined. This is questionable too. One historian, for example, writes, 
‘Hyderabad State was technically under British indirect rule, but this status was one 
of the least significant things about it’ (Leonard, 2003: 364). It is not clear if the 
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quality of governance in the princely states concerned British India at all or at least 
any more than the military alliance. It is inevitable that, pending more work on this 
theme, historians will identify the formal designation of a region as landlord or a 
princely state with a real institutional type. But such practice is at best founded on a 
shaky assumption. Therefore, it is also necessary to explore alternative methods that 
obviate the need to introduce hard segmentation between regions. One such 
alternative, spatial correlation, is explored in this paper. 
Second, in the public goods scholarship, geography is approximated by an 
array of qualities, such as soil, rainfall, and proximity to the coasts, rather than by 
any specific concept of zoning. The paper follows a classification scheme that derives 
from a definite conception of space found in colonial geography. This conception is 
justified more fully in the next section. 
Third, the design of the tests in the public goods scholarship carries a 
potential oversight, which derives from the method Austin (2008) calls ‘compression 
of history’. The design of the tests involves regressing post-1960 effects on causes 
that had been introduced 120-170 years earlier, namely, the formal inauguration of 
landlord property in 1793 or an annexation threat that was credibly applied for the 
last time in 1848-56. The procedure entails a systematic underestimation of the role 
of geographical factors in economic change and regional differentiation. Geography 
should matter to economic change in a variety of ways. Among the most important 
channels is trade in goods intensive in resources that are unequally distributed in 
space. Nineteenth century trade in India was dominated by agricultural commodity 
trade under a more or less laisser-faire regime. Therefore, trade was a geographically 
influenced process in the nineteenth century. On the other hand, the collapse of 
international trade in the 1930s, the severely regulated trade regime after 1947, 
prohibition on agricultural trade – all of these factors put an end to the colonial 
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economic system in which resources and commodities had contributed more directly 
to economic growth. Trade-GDP ratio in the 1960s was less than one-third of what it 
was in the 1920s. In other words, between 1870 and 1930 a trade-driven process of 
growth and regional differentiation had begun and exhausted itself. Correlation 
between 1960s variable values with early-1800s variable values builds in an oversight 
of this process. 
Consider the process that we may miss noticing. Throughout Indian history, 
agricultural production, long-distance trade, and the formation of powerful imperial 
states were more likely to concentrate in the deltas of eastern and southern India and 
the Ganges and Indus floodplains. These areas usually had higher cropping intensity, 
greater irrigation potentials, and yielded more revenue per area, than the arid lands, 
deserts, forests, and dry uplands in the interior. Major commercial towns tended to 
be situated in these areas, reflecting the availability of larger volumes of agricultural 
surplus in them. Not only was the quality of land better in the former zones, trade 
costs were lower too. The flat terrain and the presence of large rivers made it possible 
to move goods and people by the two relatively cheaper modes of long-distance 
transportation, namely, carts and boats. In the rest of the region, the upland and the 
forests made it impossible to move cargo over land by anything other than the 
expensive and slow mode of caravan trains.  
The British territories contained more of the coasts-deltas-floodplains, 
whereas more of the uplands and forests fell within the domain of the princely states 
(see Maps 4 and 5). The landlord areas too consisted largely of deltas, coasts, and 
riparian plains. This is well recognized in the public goods scholarship (see, for 
example, the careful treatment of agriculture in both Banerjee and Iyer, 2005, and 
Iyer, 2010). If globalization was indeed a significant influence on regional inequality, 
we should expect the British Indian and the landlord areas to forge ahead of the 
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princely states and non-landlord areas. Even though a key tradable, cotton, came 
from the dry-land, the major examples of agricultural commercialization were in fact 
located in the floodplains (wheat and sugarcane from Punjab and United Provinces), 
the coasts (rice from Krishna-Godavari delta, cotton from coastal Gujarat), and the 
deltas (rice from Bengal). Higher land revenue potential led to greater local revenue 
available for spending on public goods. Commercial profits were also channelled into 
education and health-care on quite an extensive scale, when these profits 
concentrated in the port cities, the case of Parsi charitable institutions of Bombay 
being a well-known example. The effect is expected to have been reinforced by a bias 
in the provision of public goods in favour of those goods that potentially aided 
commodity trade. For example, in colonial India, major infrastructure projects were 
prioritized with reference to agricultural production (canals) and agricultural trade 
(railways). In the mid-nineteenth century documents outlining plans for a railway 
system in India, the benefit for trade took precedence. Even as the first twenty-five 
years of railway construction proved to be a burden on the exchequer, ‘the trade and 
revenues of the country testified to the value of the new means of communication’ 
(India b, 1908, v. 3: 368). 
Putting these pieces together, we should see in the nineteenth century a 
virtuous circle develop at the regional level between trade, state capacity, and 
infrastructure. We should also see that the collapse of world trade from the 1920s 
and the regulated trade regime of post-colonial India put an end to this circle so that 
the formerly leading regions fell behind. If this hypothesis has merit, tests of 
association between 1960s inequality and institutional causes introduced in 1793 and 
1848-56 need to be re-examined for two reasons, (a) they may overlook the historical 
process of economic change and regional differentiation that occurred in between, 
and (b) they produce an outcome that is counter-intuitive. 
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A contemporary dataset permits taking a fresh look at the subject. 
 
The data and empirical strategy 
The 25-volume Imperial Gazetteer of India (1908) did not set out to collect 
statistics. But it made use of a uniform questionnaire in its descriptions of territorial 
units, so that it is possible to pick from the descriptive sections numbers pertaining 
to area, population, revenue, rainfall, cultivated and irrigated areas, roads, railway 
network, literacy, and the size of the largest town. For 430 districts of British India 
and 130 princely states, partial or full details are available. The territory includes 
lower Burma, as well as the Shan states in eastern Burma over which British India 
established overlord status without direct governance or control. Some of the regions 
so governed do not yield much usable data. Together, the units for which there is 
data (excluding Burma) accounted for 276 million persons and 1.4 million square 
miles of territory. According to the census of 1901, India’s population (excluding 
Burma) was 284 million, and the area 1.53 million square miles. Despite the 
exclusions, then, the Gazetteer dataset still accounts for 97 per cent of population 
and 93 per cent of area. Missing data for many of the smaller districts and states 
poses a problem. Using nearest comparable units some of the gaps was filled as far as 
possible. 
In the first step of the statistical analysis, these regional units are classified 
into two political clusters (British India and princely states), two institutional 
clusters (landlord zones and peasant-property zones), and two geographical clusters 
(coasts-deltas-floodplains and deserts-uplands). The first pair is easily defined. One 
practical advantage of working with a 1908 dataset is that the political units enter the 
analysis exactly as they appear on the map, whereas the use of World Bank data 
entails a complicated task of reassigning areas across new boundaries. The Gazetteer 
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data also allows us to work with undivided India and a much larger set of territorial 
units of both types. The second distinction between landlord property and non-
landlord property has seen a recent controversy (discussed above). This paper 
follows the orthodox classification that would treat as landlord districts those to 
which the designation Permanent Settlement applied. That category includes Bengal, 
Bihar, coastal Orissa, parts of the southeastern coast known as the Circars, and 
sections in Madras Presidency (especially Ramnad area) (see Map 3). 
Colonial geography (see, for example, Medlicott, 1862) divided India into four 
principal zones, the Himalayas and the submontane, the central and south Indian 
plateau, the seaboard and the delta, and the floodplains of the Ganges and the Indus. 
I ignore the mountains and the submontane, which were not part of the core 
agricultural zone except in narrow fluvial tracts, and consolidate the other zones into 
two. By this scheme, a classification consisting of coasts, deltas, and the floodplains 
of the Himalayan rivers on the one hand, and the uplands and arid regions in the 
interior on the other hand, seems to capture the most crucial difference in resource 
conditions well enough.4 Seasonally stable and controlled supply of moisture is the 
most important differentiator in this division scheme; this point is explained below. 
Productive capacity almost anywhere in India depended on agricultural 
conditions. Agriculture was constrained by the extreme tropical heat and the long dry 
season, and helped by replenishment of ground and surface water by the monsoon 
rains for three months of the year. In 1908, productivity of land depended only 
moderately upon soil nutrients. It depended more directly on cropping intensity, 
which was a function of irrigation water. Canals and surface wells, the two common 
modes of accessing water bodies depended on the availability of large rivers in 
proximity as well as alluvial soil, so that irrigation potentials reinforced the natural 
productive capacity of the deltas and the great floodplains. A flat terrain with 
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plentiful rains, and the availability of perennial rivers regenerated by Himalayan 
snowmelt rather than monsoon rain, allowed for a seasonally stable and controllable 
supply of irrigation water, and therefore, more land cultivated and above-average 
cropping intensity (Maps 4 and 5). The deltas, floodplains, and the coasts satisfied 
these conditions, or some of them. Uplands and low-rainfall zones were deficient in 
irrigation potentials. Because of this reason, the core agricultural zones in the 
subcontinent formed in the deltas, the coasts, and the floodplains of the Indus and 
the Ganges.  
A final point about the procedure adopted here needs an explanation. The 
1908 dataset is rich enough to allow us to work with a range of indicators of 
economic well-being of regions, including tax collection, literacy, transportation 
density, urbanization, and irrigation ratio or the quality of land resources. 
Descriptive analysis considers all of these benchmarks. However, none of these 
stands for a direct measure of well-being or productive capacity, as income or yield 
would. Regional domestic product before 1950 is unavailable. The attempt to 
construct regional incomes is somewhat promising for the British Indian provinces 
(see Caruana-Galizia, 2013, for an innovative reconstruction). But it is a futile quest 
for many of the princely states that did not collect basic economic data. 
For the measurement of differences between regions, therefore, a proxy is 
used. This is total revenue per square mile (or per capita) of the district/state. The 
broad assumption justifying the choice is that the size of the regional government 
should bear a positive relation with the productive capacity of the territory. Unlike 
after independence in 1947, there was little federal transfers between territories. 
Internal migration did increase in the colonial period, but with the prevailing low 
wages and very limited facilities for remittance, its impact on factor income flows 
should be relatively small. Between 50 and 70 per cent of the revenue was raised 
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from land. The land revenue collection was a product of the land tax rate (a tax 
charged per area, adjusted for the quality of land) and the proportion of cultivated 
area in total area. Economic historians have neither researched in depth, nor do they 
have sufficient data, on the trends and variations in tax rates on land, adjusted for 
quality. But the second factor, cultivable area in total area, varied greatly and was 
more or less geographically determined. Where good soil, virgin land, and water 
resources were present, cultivation inevitably expanded in the nineteenth century 
irrespective of institutional or political differences. 
That the India-wide data on the rate of land taxation remain unavailable could 
cause two potential problems. First, if the tax-rate is high in a low-income area and 
low in a high-income one, the same level of revenue collection could hide larger 
difference in incomes. Within the British districts, there is strong likelihood that tax 
rates, adjusted for land quality, tended to converge over time. The rate of taxation on 
land was based on a tradition of cadastral surveys and maintenance of local registers 
that was long-standing and pre-colonial in most parts of India. The tradition, 
furthermore, drew on notions of fair taxation that were also very old. There was an 
official discourse in British India on the desirability of following a Ricardian 
principle of taxing potential scarcity rent, while at the same time, basing the 
minimum tax rate upon indigenous tradition (see Roy, 2012, for further discussion 
on policy). Under these conditions, the tax rate would have approached, by 1908 at 
least, when these principles had been in operation for nearly a century, a uniform 
level in the temporary settlement zones. How serious this problem is with respect to 
the states we have no means to know. But persistent divergence in tax rates is 
unlikely. One earlier source reported considerable migration of peasants in some of 
the border zones between British India and the states (British Parliamentary Papers, 
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1867). In view of the prospect, it is not plausible that any unit could persist with 
outlandishly high rates of taxation without losing people. 
The second potential problem is that, if the princely states taxed their 
peasants at a different rate than the British, and were also geographically dissimilar, 
we cannot say if revenue collection reflected the tax rate or the geographical 
dissimilarity. From the little that we know, differences in tax rates did exist, but were 
random in nature. The only systematic discussion I have been able to find on this 
subject is a series of district reports produced in 1867, which discovered a mixed 
scenario. For example, adjusted for quality, the state of Baroda charged a higher tax 
rate than lands in British Gujarat, but in Punjab the differences in rates between the 
British territories and the Cis-Sutlej states were marginal (British Parliamentary 
Papers, 1867). 
Measures of inequality by this benchmark are sensitive to population in a 
systematic way. Any type of region, however defined, that produced more value per 
land area measured by fiscal revenue tended to be more densely populated (see Map 
6, and contrast Maps 7 and 8). This inverse relationship should suggest that the 
higher population density of the well-endowed regions was partly an effect of in-
migration in search of easier agricultural livelihood and partly an effect of lower 
mortality rates because these regions ensured food security better. In that case, 
population density can be seen as an endogenous variable in a process driven by 
unequal resource endowments. This prospect justifies using measures per area rather 
than measures per capita. 
Using this dataset, the paper examines the hypotheses that 
a. Regions better endowed in natural resources were also better endowed in public 
goods, which is tested by a comparison of cluster means; 
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b. Relative geographical situation exerted a significant impact upon public goods 
and productivity, which is tested by estimating spatial correlation; and 
c. The extent of regional inequality increased in the free trade era, which is tested by 
comparing two revenue datasets fifty years apart. 
 
Comparison of cluster means 
Table 1 shows the averages of the benchmark indices for these zones. The first 
four columns show that the coastal-deltaic-floodplain regions were on average 
better-off than the arid uplands and that the princely states were poorer than British 
India. These findings are interdependent since more of the coastal-deltaic-
floodplains areas formed part of British India. The last two columns suggest that 
property regime is not a good predictor of regional inequality. Some of the indices 
favour the non-landlord regions, whereas literacy and transportation density are 
higher in the landlord regions, if marginally. Of the public and quasi-public goods on 
which this dataset has any information, transportation density appears to differ 
widely, being higher in the delta-coastal-floodplains regions as well as in British 
India (see also Map 9). Literacy, however, varies in a narrower range and did not 
necessarily concentrate in the endowed zones (see also Map 10). There is also a 
difference in level of urbanization (approximated by the size of the largest town) 
between geographical and political zones. 
A number of results illustrate the poorer endowments of the princely states, 
the lower average rainfall, a smaller proportion of cultivable land, lower irrigation 
ratio, revenue per square mile, urbanization, transportation density, and literacy 
(Table 1, also Maps 1 and 4). Transportation density is especially important because 
of its potential link with trade costs. Because of the uplands terrain, all-weather 
roads there were very few in the territory of the states. As we have seen, railways 
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were at the start a private good in British India, and motivated by expected profits 
from trade. Not surprisingly, in the floodplains of the Ganges and the Indus, railways 
started early (1850s) and followed the major arteries of road and river-borne 
commercial traffic. Railways started late in the princely states, and construction was 
mainly led by the governments, though in some of the long-distance lines cutting 
through the states partnerships with private companies and British Indian 
government were also present. If these through lines are excluded, the majority of 
the lines constructed by the princely states seem to have served mainly passenger 
traffic. In some parts of India (such as Kathiawad in Gujarat), political fragmentation 
was so great that the state railways were built in small uncoordinated segments, 
often in the outlandish two-feet or ‘narrow’ gauge, that did not feed effectively into 
the long distance broad-gauge routes running through British India. This set of 
factors accounted for a lower railway density in the states. That being said, the gap in 
the railways did narrow over time. From the 1870s, the British Indian government 
started taking control of the railway system and non-commercial motivations (such 
as famine relief) took precedence. State railway construction gathered speed as well.5 
What has been said of the roads and the railways, would apply to the ports 
with even greater force. The four major ports, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, and 
Karachi, were all located in British India. Among the larger princely states, only 
Travancore-Cochin had a long seafront. In turn, the economy of this state was also 
more export-oriented than other princely states. Of the other major states, Baroda 
was well-connected by rail with Bombay port. Still, few of the princely states had easy 
access to the sea and a comparable history of long-distance commerce by sea. 
Are the differences between clusters of significant order? Table 2 presents 
results of tests of significance of the difference in means. The benchmark variable is 
revenue collection. The tests are conducted for pairs of broad clusters, as well as 
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interactions between them (for example, geographical differences within a political 
cluster). In addition, following on a procedure introduced in Banerjee and Iyer 
(2005), the difference in means between two reconstructed clusters is conducted, 
one of the clusters consisting of landlord territories and the other of non-landlord 
territories, subject to the condition that each landlord territory shared a border with 
at least one non-landlord territory. These two clusters together represent an 
institutional transition zone. If the difference between them is relatively large, we can 
conclude with more confidence that the transition mattered more than geographical 
continuity. Map 11 shows the cluster (in darker shade) for which this exercise was 
done, whereas other similar clusters of contiguous and institutionally differentiated 
territories in eastern and southeastern India (shown in lighter shade) involve too few 
observations for a meaningful result. 
The top panel of Table 2 compares the three broad pairs of categories. The 
panel suggests two conclusions. First, the results are sensitive to whether we 
normalize the variable by population or area. Princely states were significantly 
better-off than British India and the non-landlord territorial units significantly 
better-off than the landlord ones if we consider revenue per capita. If, however, we 
consider revenue per square mile, differences between political and institutional 
clusters cease to be significant (see also Maps 8 and 9). The second conclusion is that 
in terms of area, geographical difference alone is of significant order. The middle 
panel of the Table shows that, in the case of contiguous units, the nature of landed 
property makes little difference to either one of the benchmarks. The bottom panel 
shows that the geographical effect is strong and persistent within each one of these 
broad categories. 
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In view of the criticism of cluster-based analyses offered earlier, it is desirable 
that we confirm the nature of the differentiation by a method that does not depend 
on clustering at all. Spatial autocorrelation supplies such a tool. 
 
Spatial autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation in cross-section datasets is a recognized problem, but tends to 
receive less attention in economic history than that in time-series or pooled data. 
This is so because the phenomenon of correlated errors is more pro-intuitive in 
temporal data as the effect of ‘inertia’ than correlated errors in spatial data. In recent 
years, spatial autocorrelation has been used more often in several fields straddling 
economics and geography. One example is consumption studies, when the 
consumption of one family depends on the consumption by its next-door neighbour. 
A regression of consumption on income or wealth will not produce efficient estimates 
in such contexts and a special test is needed to measure the extent of correlation 
between neighbour units (Case, 1999). Other examples of the use of the tool are 
studies on diffusion of technological innovation (Ó Huallacháin and Leslie, 2005), 
the clustering of urban poverty (Longley and Tobón, 2004), and the spread of 
epidemic contagion (Smallman-Raynor, Johnson and Cliff, 2002). 
The technique finds frequent use in geography. The usage can be linked to an 
idea known as Tobler's law, ‘everything is related to everything else, but near things 
are more related than distant things’ (Tobler, 2004). This statement can mean an 
observed regularity. But it tends to be seen as a principle, which is that proximity 
matters qua proximity, or neighbouring units are similar because of their 
geographical location. Another way of saying this is that ‘latitudes and longitudes .. 
can to some extent predict (or estimate) .. the degrees of similarity .. between 
locations.’ (Tobler, 2004). Political or institutional variable do not perfectly satisfy 
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this principle, because along the transition zones between politico-institutional 
regimes, latitudes and longitudes fail to predict outcomes. Any effect that crosses 
borders between territorial units does not necessarily influence the aggregate 
measure either. If such local effects are a mix of positive and negative correlation (an 
example of a negative effect being one where one unit draws trade away from or 
exploits a neighbour), they can even cancel each other out.  Variables that do satisfy 
the principle throughout a spatial dataset are those by definition related to space, 
such as soil, rainfall, terrain, or disease contagion. If the spatial correlation is high 
and positive, the result by itself suggests a spatially dependent influence. If we are 
explaining the generation of land revenue, distribution of natural agricultural 
resources could be the likely reason for an observed high spatial autocorrelation. If 
the cluster averages also show that location matters to revenue (as in the previous 
section), there is stronger confirmation of the hypothesis. 
Regression models, in the presence of such a process, can be of questionable 
value. If we have reason to assume that the causal model is such that the error of one 
unit should predict errors of neighbourhood units, it is necessary to measure the 
extent of the problem. A regression with fixed effects such as region dummy will still 
entail an underestimation of the residual variance common to all such cases. 
The specification for an explanatory model in the presence of spatially 
autocorrelated errors is, 
𝑦 = 𝑟𝑊𝑦 + 𝑥𝑏 + 𝑒 
where e are the spatially uncorrelated errors, x the independent variable values for 
regions i = 1 .. n, r the spatial coefficient, and W a matrix of weights capturing 
contiguity, distance, overlap, lagged distance, or any other appropriate index of 
neighbourhood effects between each pair of yi and yj. In actual computation, the 
weights are row standardized values. The paper takes ‘first order contiguity’, where 
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the weights are 1 when region pairs share borders and 0 otherwise. There are a 
number of measures for spatial autocorrelation coefficient. The commonly used ones 
are products of similarity between paired values and proximity between them. One of 
these is Moran’s I, defined as 
𝐼 =  
𝑛
𝑊 
∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗(𝑦𝑖 − ?̅?)(𝑦𝑗 − ?̅?)
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ (𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 − ?̅?)
2
  
where wij is the weight between observation i and j, and W is the sum of all wij’s, and 
another is Geary’s C, which estimates similarity between paired values as difference 
between them rather than as deviations from respective means. 
𝐶 =  
(𝑛 − 1) ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖 (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑗)
2
2𝑊(𝑦𝑖 − ?̅?)2
 
(see Griffith and Layne, 1999). The I takes a value between -1 and 1, with positive 
values indicating positive autocorrelation. The second measure is commonly used for 
local spatial autocorrelation. 
Moran’s I is estimated in three separate cases (Table 3).6 First, a group of 
north Indian units are taken, each one of which shares a border with at least one 
different political entity; that is, a princely state is included in the cluster only if it is 
contiguous to one or more British Indian districts (North India cluster in Map 12). In 
the second set, again from north India, each territorial unit within a cluster shares 
border with at least one other unit with a different institutional entity; that is, if it is a 
landlord area, it is contiguous to at least one non-landlord district. The measure is 
carried out for territories sharing borders with Bihar landlord districts (Bihar cluster 
in Map 11). The third exercise includes the entire population of territorial units. The 
first two procedures cannot be replicated in those regions where a reasonable 
number of contiguous units with opposing political-institutional configuration 
cannot be found, or where these entities are too dissimilar in size. For example, the 
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first procedure can be repeated only for a much smaller number of states and 
districts in Mysore region (south India cluster in Map 12), and for a too diverse a 
group in Hyderabad region (not separately shown in Map 12). Similarly, the second 
procedure can be in principle carried out for eastern Bengal along the borders of 
Assam (non-landlord) and Bengal (landlord), and in the Circars, but the number of 
observations would be too few.7 
If the null hypothesis is that geographical situation exerts no systematic 
influence on the economic profile of regions, we would expect the autocorrelation 
coefficient to take a value near zero. Such a value might signify that political status or 
institutional features exert a strong influence in the dataset.8 If the coefficient takes a 
significant value, we should conclude that, overriding political-cum-institutional 
differences, neighbouring units tend to be sufficiently similar. 
Table 3 shows the results of the exercise. Revenue per area, population 
density, revenue per person and irrigation ratio all show positive autocorrelation; in 
ten of the twelve estimates the coefficient is significant. When we come to public and 
quasi-public goods, such as roads and schools, the neighbourhood effect seems to 
weaken, even though it remains positive in the case of states and districts, and in the 
global dataset. The exceptional case of literacy is pro-intuitive, and shows that only in 
education, where ideology of social welfare played an explicit role, was there an 
effective catching up via state intervention. Overall, it seems reasonable to conclude a 
strong effect of geographical situation, qualified but not overturned in the case of 
public goods. 
The final step in the analysis consists of asking, was there divergence or 
convergence in colonial India? In order to answer the question, I combine the 1908 
dataset with an earlier source. 
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Trend 
The earlier source in question (Anon., 1853, Thornton, 1853) had collected 
data on the size of major states and East India Company territories. The source 
covers 13 regional political units, including major princely states. Although data for 
the British Indian territories began to be presented regularly and in reasonable detail 
from about 1840, this was the first time, and the only occasion in the nineteenth 
century when the states and the provinces received equal coverage in the same 
source. The data consists of area, population and revenue. Table 4 presents the 
descriptive summary of the statistics. Compared with Table 1, the 1853 report 
captured 83 per cent of the final extent of British India, only 21 per cent of the area of 
the princely states, but together about half of the total area. 
Again using only revenue collection data, I estimate coefficients of variation 
(the measure known as unconditional σ-convergence). It has limitations, but it is 
easy to use and a better measure to use when the number of observations is small, as 
in the case of 1853. Subject to the caution that the 1850 finding cannot be very 
robust, the results (Table 5) point at increasing inequality in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. For a shorter span of time within the range, 1875-1911, Caruana-
Galizia (2013) finds evidence of convergence in regional GDP. The units are the 
British Indian provinces. For what the 1850 data are worth, the Gazetteer dataset 
suggests an unchanging level of inequality among the British Indian territories, and a 
divergence only if we include the states. The interpretation I adduce to this finding is 
that the pattern of growth in the nineteenth century, being dependent on primary 
commodity export, favoured the geographically well situated areas proportionate 
more than the others, leading to a rise in inequality. 
On the other hand, there was almost certainly a great decline in inequality in 
the twentieth century, which trend continued on in the early decades of planned 
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development under a national government. Again, these trends alert us to the 
problem that the results are sensitive to whether we normalize the variables with 
area or population. Between 1853 and 1908, population was stagnant, but population 
growth accelerated after 1920, mainly in the fertile plains. By 1960, then, the gains of 
the more resource-endowed regions were being shared amongst a much larger 
population than in the colonial times. 
 
Conclusion 
The statistical analysis carried out above leads to the conclusion that the effect 
of geographical endowments on the pattern of regional inequality in fiscal capacity 
and public goods was significant in the late nineteenth century. The conclusion is 
based on three specific findings derived from a 1908 dataset: averages differed 
between geographical zones more consistently than between political and 
institutional zones, neighbourhood exerted a positive and significant effect on 
regional attributes, and regional inequality rose when there was free trade and fell 
when free trade ended. 
The conclusion differs from that of the recent scholarship on colonialism and 
public goods discussed earlier, which discounts the influence of geographical 
differences upon regional inequality (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Banerjee, Iyer and 
Somanathan, 2011; Iyer, 2012). There are several possible reasons for a discrepancy. 
First, subject to the limitations of the 1908 dataset, the present paper makes use of a 
specific unit of measurement, namely, fiscal capacity per area. Second, the present 
paper classifies geographical zones differently, following a contemporary 
classification scheme. Third, resource endowments did, in fact, play a bigger role in 
the process of economic change at the turn of the twentieth century. Around that 
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time it outweighed other influences; but the effect faded away by the middle of the 
twentieth century. 
The third possibility, a plausible case for which is made in the paper, suggests 
a particular dynamic of economic transformation in prewar India, led relatively more 
by globalization and market integration, rather than by the region’s own specific 
political heritage. About 1908, the deltas and the floodplains allowed for greater 
density of cultivation than the rest of India, and therefore, more revenue per land. A 
virtuous circle developed between land productivity, state capacity, and 
transportation density. The circle worked better with roads than railways, where the 
gap narrowed, partly because railways began as a private good in British India and 
was state-led in the princely states all along. A similar qualification needs to be added 
with literacy. Again, much schooling in British India was a private good and sensitive 
to commercialization, whereas in the princely states, education and health-care were 
supplied by the government to a greater extent. 
The final piece in the story is the hypothesis of a rise and decline of regional 
inequality. By virtue of possession of more fertile land and easier access to ports, the 
deltas, floodplains, and coasts were better situated to gain from the nineteenth 
century globalization, which encouraged export of crops like wheat and rice, 
increased the capacity of the states as well as commercial actors, and led to more 
spending both on private and government accounts on roads, railways, schools, and 
hospitals. The geographically endowed zones took part in a ‘Smithian’ growth 
process, whereas the princely states were less able to do so.9 The Smithian process 
slowed after the Great Depression, and was deliberately weakened after 1947. After 
1931, the colonial state became bankrupt, the world market in primary products 
crashed, the ideology of laisser-faire was under attack, a new ideology of the 
developmental state was in ascendance, and growing fear of famine led to the 
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imposition of strict controls over commodity trade. When social overhead 
expenditure was made a priority by the rising ideological tide, the princely states 
proved less constrained by the commitment to imperial priorities than was British 
India, whereas the commodity processing and exporting zones lost their lead in the 
new economy. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Political, Geographical, and Institutional  Zones, 
1908 
 British 
India 
Princely 
States 
Coasts, 
deltas, 
floodplains 
Uplands and 
arid areas 
Landlord Non-
landlord 
Population (million) 224.0 60.4 159.1 125.3 78 145 
Area (1000 sq miles) 901 577 437 1042 187 714 
Density (person/sq mile) 249 105 364 120 419 203 
Rainfall (inch)a 43 22 43 31 66 37 
Agricultural land/total area 
(%)a 
40 34 46 34 42.7 42.9 
Agricultural land per capita 
(sq mile/1000 persons)b 
1.61 2.35 1.24 2.43 1.01 2.16 
Irrigated land/agricultural 
land (%)a 
20.8 14.6 27.5 14.6 17.8 21.0 
Revenue/sq mile (Rs)a 518 395 737 359 549 694 
Land Revenue/Revenue (%)a 63 51 65 56 46 73 
Revenue per capita (Rs)b 2.07 3.91 2.04 3.00 1.31 2.17 
Road and rail mileage per 
1000 sq milea 
46 29 48 36 58 54 
Literacy (%)b 4.5 3.6 4.6 4.0 5.33 4.16 
Size of largest townb 42558 21739 49932 23166 31735 43195 
a. Area-weighted. b. Population-weighted. 
Sources: Tables 1-3 present calculations based on the Imperial Gazetteer data 
described fully in the text.  
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Table 2. Tests of Significance of Difference in Means (t-statistics) 
 Revenue/capita Revenue/area 
British India and Princely States -5.294* 0.257 
Two geographical zones (Coast-delta-floodplains 
and uplands) 
-3.981* 6.265* 
Landlord and Non-landlord units -7.865* -0.893 
Landlord and non-landlord units sharing borders 2.271 0.811 
Two geographical zones within British India -1.669 6.611* 
Two geographical zones within Princely States 0.573 3.184* 
Two geographical zones within Landlord areas 2.034 3.618* 
Two geographical zones within non-landlord areas -0.711 6.343* 
** Significant at 1% level. 
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Table 3. Moran’s I output 
Territorial groups Princely states 
and districts that 
share borders 
(North India in 
Map 12) 
Landlord and 
non-landlord 
units sharing 
borders (Bihar in 
Map 11) 
Global 
Revenue/capita 0.170 0.231   0.352* 
Revenue/area 0.350* 0.374* 0.336* 
Population density 0.558* 0.587* 0.701* 
Irrigation ratio 0.535* 0.603* 0.586* 
Transportation density 0.308 -0.311* 0.465* 
Literacy 0.146 -0.063 0.171 
* P-value of z-statistic less than 0.01 (one-tailed). 
Number of observations for the three territorial groups are 58 (28 states and 30 
districts), 17 (8 landlord, 9 non-landlord), and 388 respectively. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics, 1850 
  British India 
 
Princely States 
1 Population (million) 131 21 
2 Area (1000 sq miles) 746 165 
3 Population density 188 120 
4 Revenue per capita (Rs) 2.3 1.6 
5 Revenue per sq mile (Rs) 409 202 
6 Rainfall, annual (inches) 41 34 
Note: Based on data reported in Anon (1853). Only the territorial units reported in 
Table 1 are considered. Awadh is included in British India, to make this data 
comparable with 1908, though formal annexation occurred in 1856. Rows 3 and 4 are 
population-weighted averages, and rows 5 and 6 are area-weighted averages. For 
rainfall, averages are taken for these regions from later meteorological observations. 
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Table 5. Measures of regional inequality in colonial India  
 1850 
(13) 
1908 
(388) 
1950 
(14) 
1965 
(16) 
Colonial India (R/A) 0.68 0.84   
Colonial India (R/P) 0.44 1.16   
States, Indian Union (Y)   0.25 0.17 
Note: The numbers stand for coefficients of variation of revenue per square mile 
(R/A), revenue per capita (R/P) or state domestic product per capita (Y). The 
number of observations is shown in brackets. 
Sources: For 1850, Anon. (1853) and Thornton (1853); for 1908, India (1908); for 
1950 and 1964, Mahajan (1973) and Tiwari (1973) respectively. 
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Map 1. Rainfall and topography, 1908 
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Map 2. Princely States and British Indian Provinces, 1908. 
Source for all maps: Imperial Gazetteer maps (only major states are named). 
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Map 3. Landlord (zamindari) areas (minor districts excluded). 
  
40 
 
 
Map 4. Cultivated area in total area (per cent), 1908. 
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Map 5. Irrigated area in total area (per cent), 1908. 
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Map 6. Population density (persons per square mile), 1908. 
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Map 7. Revenue per square mile (Rs.), 1908. 
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Map 8. Revenue per person (Rs.), 1908. 
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Map 9. Roads and railways, miles per 100 square miles, 1908. 
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Map 10. Literacy, 1908. 
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Map 11. Contiguous Landlord and non-landlord territories. 
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Map 12. Contiguous British Indian districts and princely states.  
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Notes 
                                                          
1 On general political history of the ‘princely states’, see Fisher (1991); on description 
of ruling families, Malleson (1875). Current historical scholarship deals mainly with 
political culture, administrative culture, and social modernization. See, for example, 
Jeffrey (1978); Bhagavan (2003); and the survey by Zutshi (2009). 
2 On the conditionality, see Lee-Warner (1910), pp. 280-312. 
3 For a statement from a princely ruler on general comparative development, see 
Haynes (1980). The paper concludes on the basis of a comparison of a pair of 
neigbouring state and district that the principal difference between the two was the 
integration of the latter into the long-distance transportation network allowing for 
more commercial opportunities. 
4 See also Chen Han-Seng’s classification of South Asia into twenty-one agro-
ecological regions (Thorner, ed., 1996). Hydrography, which is one of the 
benchmarks for regionalization, is the main criterion used in this paper. The 
representation of land use and ‘general economic development’ in this work 
resembles the corresponding maps in this paper. 
5 On railway development in the princely states, Ramusack (2004: 191-6) is a useful 
survey. 
6 In actual estimation, a few missing blocks were imputed zero values. 
7 It is necessary to add the qualification that in some of these segments, the political 
or institutional transition zone and agro-ecological transition zone overlapped to 
some extent. In such cases, the observed contiguity measure cannot be interpreted 
easily. However, in the segments selected for the exercise, the overlap is of modest 
order, and far from close. 
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8 An additional reason to exclude these zones from the test is stated in fn 7. The 
coefficient cannot be easily interpreted if geographical features change drastically 
over relatively short distances. This problem is likely to affect the outcome for the 
southern peninsula, which is a mix between arid uplands and fertile river valleys, and 
for eastern Bengal where a cordillera of the Himalayas run more or less along the 
border between landlord and non-landlord zones. These areas are excluded from the 
test. 
9 This is economic growth driven by the extension of markets with or without 
institutional and technological change. For a discussion, see Saito (2006). 
